

---

# Incentivizing the Biased Requesters: Truthful Task Assignment Mechanisms in Crowdsourcing


---

**Jia Xu**, Hui Li, Yanxu Li, Dejun Yang, Tao Li

School of Computer, Jiangsu Key Laboratory of Big Data Security & Intelligent Processing,  
Nanjing University of Posts & Telecommunications



# Crowdsourcing with Biased Requesters



I intend to hire native Hungarian speakers to order Hungarian to English translations



I expect to assign the mobile crowdsourcing tasks to the workers who are close by the specific locations



Preference over workers!



I wish to allocate the research projects to the students who are interesting in



# Crowdsourcing Process



each consists of a task and a preference set

preference set: a set of compatible workers

Designing truthful task assignment mechanisms to maximize the total value



# Challenges



**Compatibility**

**Strategic action**

**Workload feasibility**



# Contributions



first work to design truthful assignment mechanisms for the crowdsourcing systems with biased requesters

formulate the *Valuation Maximizing Assignment (VMA)* problem in three different models

design an assignment mechanism for each of these models to solve the *VMA* problem. We show that the designed mechanisms satisfy four desirable properties: computational efficiency, workload feasibility, preference (universal) truthfulness, and constant approximation



# II-Model: Identical workload Identical value



## Objective Function:

$$\max_A v(A) = \sum_{k \in W} |A^k| = \sum_{i \in R} |A_i|$$

## Constraints:


$$(1) |A^k| \leq 1, \forall k \in W$$

$$(2) |A_i| \leq 1, \forall i \in R$$

$$(3) A \in \{(i, k) \mid i \in R, k \in P_i\}$$




# It Looks So Easy?!



Requesters

Tasks



... ..



Maximum  
Bipartite  
Matching

Workers





# However





The *VMA Problem*



*Maximum* *Bipartite* *Matching*

untruthful

*Ford Fulkerson Algorithm*







# TAM-II



**Sort the  
task-worker pairs**

Input: Worker Set  $W$ , Request Set  $B$

1:  $A \leftarrow \emptyset$ ;

2: Represent all pairs  $(i, k), i \in R, k \in P_i$  as

$(1,1),(1,2),\dots,(2,1),(2,2),\dots,(n, m)$ , and the sequence is denoted by  $\mathcal{H}$ ;

**Compute the size of  
the maximum  
matching**

3:  $\mathcal{H}' \leftarrow \mathcal{H}$ ;

4:  $N \leftarrow MBM(\mathcal{H})$ ;

**Remove the  
allocations which  
cannot reduce the  
size of maximum  
matching**

5: for all  $j \in \mathcal{H}$  in order do

6:      $N' \leftarrow MBM(\mathcal{H}' \setminus \{j\})$ ;

7:     if  $N' \geq N$  then

8:         Remove  $j$  from  $\mathcal{H}'$ ;

9:     end if

10: end for

11:  $A \leftarrow \mathcal{H}'$ ;

12: return( $A$ );



# Generalize to the Non-identical Value Case



## Objective Function:

$$\max_A v(A) = \sum_{(i,k) \in A} v_i^k = \sum_{(i,k) \in A} F(a_i) * I_k$$

## Constraints:


$$(1) |A^k| \leq 1, \forall k \in W$$

$$(2) |A_i| \leq 1, \forall i \in R$$

$$(3) A \in \{(i,k) \mid i \in R, k \in P_i\}$$



# How About Hungarian Method ?







# Check the Truthfulness of Hungarian Method



## An Example



Hungarian method is untruthful

Requester2 lies



# A Greedy Algorithm—TAM-IN



Sort all pairs



Select the pairs

Input: Worker Set  $W$ , Request Set  $B$ , Effort Indicators  $I$   
1: Sort all pairs  $(i, k)$ ,  $i \in R, k \in P_i$  based on  $v_i^k$  in nonincreasing order and the sequence is denoted by  $\mathcal{J}$ ;

```
2:  $A \leftarrow \emptyset$ ;  
3: for all  $j \in \mathcal{J}$  in order do  
4:   if  $A \cup \{j\}$  is a matching on  $G(R, W, J)$  then  
5:      $A \leftarrow A \cup \{j\}$ ;  
6:   end if  
7: end for  
8: return  $(A)$ ;
```



# Non-identical Workload Non-identical Value Case



## Objective Function:

$$\max_A v(A) = \sum_{(i,k) \in A} v_i^k$$

## Constraints:

$$(1) \sum_{i \in A^k} c_i \leq C_k, \forall k \in W$$

$$(2) |A_i| \leq 1, \forall i \in R$$

$$(3) A \in \{(i,k) \mid i \in R, k \in P_i\}$$



# Try greedy Assignment Mechanisms



*The VMA problem in the NN-Model is NP- hard since it contains a MKP (Multiple Knapsack Problem)*

***GREEDY-VALUE***

Select the task-worker pairs iteratively in nonincreasing order of value

***GREEDY- DENSITY***

Select the task-worker pairs iteratively in nonincreasing order of the ratio of the value to the workload



# How Good are Greedy Algorithms?



**Computational efficiency**



**Workload feasibility**



**Preference truthfulness**



**Approximation**








# Approximation Ratio of GREEDY-VALUE



## A Example



Assume that  $\alpha > 1, \alpha - \varepsilon < 1, \varepsilon \in (0, 1/2]$ .

Since  $1 > \alpha - \varepsilon$ ,  $v(A_{\text{value}}) = 1$

$$v(A_{\text{opt}}) = \left\lfloor \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right\rfloor (\alpha - \varepsilon).$$

Let  $\varepsilon$  be sufficiently close to 0, the approximation ratio of GREEDY-VALUE tends to infinite.



# Approximation Ratio of GREEDY-DENSITY




## A Example

Assume  $\alpha > 1, \alpha\varepsilon < 1, \varepsilon \in (0,1)$ .

Since  $\frac{\alpha\varepsilon}{\varepsilon} = \alpha > 1$ ,  $v(A_{density}) = \alpha\varepsilon$

Since  $\alpha\varepsilon < 1$ ,  $v(A_{opt}) = 1$

If we let  $\varepsilon$  be sufficiently close to 0, the approximation ratio of GREEDY-DENSITY tends to infinite.



## Bad News

*There is no upper bound of the approximation ratio for either GREEDY-VALUE or GREEDY-DENSITY.*



# A Random Method—TAM-NN



Input: Worker Set  $W$ , Request Set  $B$ , Effort Indicators  $I$ ,  
Workload Constraints  $C$

1: Generate a random number  $o$  from the uniform distribution  
on the interval  $[0,1]$ ;

2:  $A \leftarrow \emptyset$ ;

3: **if**  $o \leq 1/2$  **then**

4:      $A \leftarrow \text{GREEDY-VALUE}(W, B, I, C)$ ;

5: **else**

6:      $A \leftarrow \text{GREEDY-DENSITY}(W, B, I, C)$ ;

7: **end if**

8: return( $A$ )



# Summary of Theoretical Analysis



**Theorem 1.** *TAM-II is computationally efficient, workload feasible, preference truthful and optimal for VMA problem in the II-Model.*

**Theorem 2.** *TAM-IN is computationally efficient, workload feasible, preference truthful and 2-approximate in the IN-Model.*


**Theorem 3.** *TAM-NN is computationally efficient, workload feasible, preference truthful and 4-approximate in the NN-Model.*




# Performance Evaluation




## A. Value



(a) The value versus the number of requesters



(b) The value versus the number of workers



(c) The value versus the size of preference set

The average approximation ratio of TAM-IN is 1.27


On average, TAM-NN can output 8.45% and 12.38% more value than GREEDY-VALUE and GREEDY-DENSITY, respectively




# Performance Evaluation




## B. Running Time



(a) The running time versus the number of requesters



(b) The running time versus the number of workers



(c) The running time versus the size of preference set

***TAM-IN* only takes averagely 9.52% of time required by *HANGARIAN* in all cases**

# Conclusion

We have investigated the task assignment incentive mechanisms for the crowdsourcing system with biased requesters.

We have studied three models of crowdsourcing and formulated the *VMA* problem for each model. We presented the task assignment mechanisms for all three models, and proved that they are computationally efficient, workload feasible, preference (universally) truthful and constant approximate.

Extensive results are presented to verify our theoretical analysis.



# Thank You!

## Q & A

<http://faculty.cs.njupt.edu.cn/~xujia/home.html>  
xujia@njupt.edu.cn